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PHONEY BUSINESS: SUCCESSFUL CALLER
ID SPOOFING REGULATION REQUIRES
MORE THAN THE TRUTH IN CALLER ID
ACT OF 2009
Alicia Hatfield*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Doug Bates had a terrifying experience when he was
forced to defend his home against what he thought were prowlers.1
After putting his two toddlers to sleep, he and his wife heard noises
coming from their backyard.2 He grabbed a knife and faced the
dark to defend his family.3 Once outside, he quickly found himself
blinded by a spotlight and disoriented by a booming command to
drop the knife from his hand.4 As he was tackled to the ground, he
wondered what could possibly have caused a SWAT team to
surround his home.5 The answer to that question was Randal Ellis.6
*
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Mark Del Bianco and Jerry Grant.
1
Salvador Hernandez, Lake Forest Family Thankful ‘911’ Hacker Going to
Prison, ORANGE CNTY. REG., Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.ocregister.com/news/
family-185237-bates-home.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See id.
6
Hernandez, supra note 1.
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Just moments before, Ellis placed a call to 911 with “spoofed”
caller identification (“caller ID”) information, making the call
appear to have originated from within Mr. Bates’ home, a practice
known as “swatting.”7 After Ellis told the dispatcher that drugs led
him to murder his sister, the SWAT team was deployed to Mr.
Bates’ quiet California home.8 Fortunately, the SWAT team
handled the situation with caution and no one was injured.9 While
swatting is one of the many illegitimate uses of caller ID spoofing
technology that has garnered significant media attention in recent
years,10 there are many legitimate and socially desirable uses of the
technology.11 Nonetheless, Congress introduced multiple anticaller ID spoofing bills beginning in 2006.12
The Truth In Caller ID Act of 2009 (“TICIDA”), which
outlaws the use of caller ID spoofing with intent “to defraud, cause
harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value,” was signed into law
7

SWAT Teams Deployed in 911 Telephone Fraud, MSNBC (Feb. 1, 2009,
4:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28965633/.
8
See id.
9
Hernandez, supra note 1. Ellis was sentenced to three years in prison. Id.
10
See generally 152 CONG. REC. H3386, H3388 (daily ed. June 6, 2006)
(statement of Rep. Engel). Most citizens trust the information displayed on
caller ID devices since most remain unaware that caller ID spoofing technology
exists. Id.
11
See Part II.B.1 (describing the many legitimate uses of caller ID
spoofing); see also 155 CONG. REC. S170, S17374 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009)
(statement of Sen. Nelson) (highlighting various illegitimate and legitimate
uses).
12
See Truth in Caller ID Act of 2010, H.R. 1258, 111th Cong. (2010);
Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, S. 30, 111th Cong. (2009); Preventing
Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 1110,
111th Cong. (2009); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, S. 704, 110th Cong. (2008);
Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act of 2007,
H.R. 740, 110th Cong. (2007); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, H.R. 251, 110th
Cong. (2007); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, S. 2630, 109th Cong. (2006);
Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act, H.R.
5304, 109th Cong. (2006); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, H.R. 5126, 109th
Cong. (2006). Many states have also proposed or passed laws making the act of
caller ID spoofing illegal. See generally Margaret Stolar & Chuck Gall, Bills
Introduced to Battle Caller ID Spoofing, 13 CONSUMER FIN. SERVS. L. REP. 5
(2009).
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on December 22, 2010.13 However, successful caller ID spoofing
regulation requires more than a statute outlawing illegitimate uses
of the technology, most of which were already illegal under
existing federal laws. It is imperative that the Department of
Justice, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), and
Congress accomplish effective regulation of the industry to curb
the nefarious aspects of spoofing and preserve legitimate uses. This
Note argues that the TICIDA cannot successfully regulate the
caller ID spoofing industry because the criminal penalties under
the TICIDA are too minimal to deter most illegitimate users; the
TICIDA does not expressly criminalize text message spoofing; and
the TICIDA does not create comprehensive regulation of the caller
ID spoofing industry. In order to maintain the availability of this
technology for legitimate users,14 the Department of Justice should
creatively and aggressively prosecute illegitimate users under
alternative federal laws when doing so would result in greater
deterrence. In addition, the FCC should request that Congress
modify the TICIDA to define the term “call” as both voice and text
calls expressly so that text message spoofing does not become a
successor technology. Lastly, the FCC should promulgate
regulations that facilitate the tracing of spoofed calls and create a
Do-Not-Spoof list. Part II explains caller ID spoofing and
highlights its most common legitimate and illegitimate uses. Part
III analyzes state and federal attempts at anti-caller ID spoofing
legislation. Part IV suggests steps the Department of Justice, the
FCC, and Congress should take in order to maximize deterrence of
illegitimate uses and create successful regulation of the caller ID
spoofing industry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is Caller ID Spoofing?
To understand how caller ID spoofing is accomplished, it is
13

Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, S. 30, 111th Cong. (2009).
See generally 156 CONG. REC. H2522 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010)
(statement of Rep. Boucher) (explaining that the TICIDA is intended to outlaw
nefarious uses but permit legitimate uses).
14
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helpful to first understand traditional caller ID service. When a
phone call is placed over the public switched telephone network15
or on a cell phone, information about the phone call is sent along
with the call itself to the called party.16 The calling party number
(“CPN”), one type of data sent with the call, is a ten-digit number
that identifies the phone number from which the call is being
placed.17 If the called party subscribes to a caller ID service, the
receiving phone company searches its records for the name that
corresponds with the incoming CPN,18 and the caller ID device
displays that information.19 If the caller blocks her caller ID
information by dialing *67 before the called party’s number, the
CPN will include a marker to communicate to the receiving phone
company that the call is intended to be anonymous.20 In this case,
the receiving phone company will not display the caller’s CPN
information.21
Another piece of information sent along with a phone call is
the automatic number identification (“ANI”).22 The ANI also
contains the ten-digit caller number; however, it is not used for
caller ID purposes.23 This information is sent with the phone call
regardless of whether the caller utilized *67 call blocking.24 The
ANI enables premium phone services, such as 800 and 900
numbers, to identify which telephone account to charge for
15

The public switched telephone network (“PSTN”), or the plain old
telephone service, is the structure that transmits landline phone calls. HARRY
NEWTON, NEWTON’S TELECOM DICTIONARY 667 (20th ed. 2004); see also
David Roos, How Telephone Country Codes Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://communication.howstuffworks.com/telephone-country-codes1.htm (last
visited Feb. 4, 2011).
16
47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(a) (2006).
17
NEWTON, supra note 15, at 148.
18
Ward Mundy, Asterisk Caller ID Perfected: Caller ID Superfecta 2.0,
NERD VITTLES (May 11, 2009), http://nerdvittles.com/?p=609.
19
How Does Caller ID Work?, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://www.howstuff
works.com/question409.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
20
47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(b) (2006).
21
Id.
22
NEWTON, supra note 15, at 63.
23
Id. at 147.
24
Id. at 63.
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incoming phone calls.25 When caller ID information is spoofed,
both the ANI and the CPN are changed to a fake phone number.26
1. Traditional Caller ID Spoofing
Primitive forms of caller ID spoofing were possible if the
spoofer had sufficient knowledge of the telephone system to
manipulate the signals that communicate caller ID information to
the caller ID device.27 The creation of voice over IP (“VoIP”)
technology28 and the availability of web-based commercial
spoofing companies has made caller ID spoofing more
accessible.29 When spoofing is accomplished via a commercial
spoofing company, the spoofer first pays for a block of minutes in
advance to establish an account.30 To place a spoofed call, the
spoofer either calls the company’s 800 number or visits its
website.31 Next, the spoofer enters the number he is calling,
followed by the number he would like displayed as the fake caller

25

Id.
See The Truth in Caller ID Act: Hearing on H.R. 251 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecomm. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 110th Cong. 25 (2007) [hereinafter Knight Statement] (statement of
Allison Knight, Staff Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center).
27
S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 2 (2007). Spoofers created false caller ID tones
to trick the caller ID device via software or recording a caller ID signal they
wished to emulate. AOH Staff & dethme0w, Orange Boxing/Caller ID Hacking
FAQ, ART OF HACKING (Oct. 21, 2006), http://www.artofhacking.com/files/OBFAQ.HTM.
28
Voice-Over-Internet Protocol, FED. COMM. COMM’N, http://www.
fcc.gov/voip/ (last updated Feb. 1, 2010). VoIP is an alternative to traditional
phone service that utilizes the Internet to place phone calls. Id.
29
S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 2; see also Judy L. Thomas, ‘Spoofers’
Sidestepping Caller ID Raise Alarm, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 20, 2009,
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2009-09-20/news/0909200100_1_caller-idcalled-spoofing-phone-calls (noting that the number one spoofing company,
SpoofCard, has over three million customers).
30
Frequently Asked Questions, SPOOFCARD, http://www.spoofcard.com/
faq (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
31
See SPOOFCARD, http://www.spoofcard.com/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2011)
(enabling users to place spoofed phone calls from the main page of the website).
26
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ID number.32 Depending on the service used, the spoofer may also
have the option to record the call or to alter the sound of his
voice.33 It is impossible to trace spoofed calls except by
subpoenaing the spoofing company’s records to determine the
identity of the customer.34
Spoofing is also possible for individual users of VoIP
services.35 VoIP technology utilizes a text-based method for
initiating and ending a phone call, known as Session Initiation
Protocol (“SIP”).36 Spoofing is accomplished when the spoofer
uses software, often a program known as Asterisk, to alter his SIP
information.37 Multiple websites provide step-by-step instructions
for this process.38 Most VoIP providers prevent their users from
altering their SIP information,39 but some providers do not secure
their systems.40
2. Text Message Caller ID Spoofing
Text message spoofing takes place when a party changes the
“from” information in a text message so that it appears that the text
message was sent from a different telephone.41 In this way, text
32

Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 30.
155 CONG. REC. S170, S173 (2009) (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) (statement of
Sen. Nelson).
34
Thomas, supra note 29. Spoofcard reports that it is highly cooperative
with law enforcement efforts to stem illegal uses of the technology. Id.
35
VonageTPA, Comment to Caller ID Spoofing, VONAGE VOIP F. (Mar. 2,
2006, 12:35 AM), http://www.vonage-forum.com/ftopic11704.html.
36
NEWTON, supra note 15, at 752.
37
Mundy, supra note 18.
38
VonageTPA, supra note 35; see also Reports: Automated Caller ID/ANI
Spoofing, ROOTSECURE.NET (July 8, 2004), http://www.rootsecure.net/?p=
reports/callerid_spoofing.
39
See VonageTPA, supra note 35. Vonage is an example of a company that
prevents users from altering SIP information. Id.
40
Ward Mundy, Asterisk Caller ID on Steroids: Here’s How, NERD
VITTLES (Feb. 9, 2006), http://nerdvittles.com/index.php?p=115 (claiming VoIP
providers TelaSIP and Teliax are among the few that still allow caller ID
manipulation).
41
E-mail from Jerry Grant, JR Computer Consulting, to author (Sept. 19,
33
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message spoofing is similar to caller ID spoofing, except that it
affects mobile phones exclusively. Text message spoofing is
usually accomplished through a text message spoofing website,
often owned by the same companies that own caller ID spoofing
websites.42 The only way to verify that the text message was
spoofed is to look at the alleged sender’s phone records for the
absence of the outgoing message.43
B. Uses of Caller ID Spoofing
Caller ID spoofing has many uses.44 Although some states’
approach to caller ID spoofing classifies all caller ID spoofing as
illegitimate, Congress has recognized legitimate uses. The floor
debates on the TICIDA evince a Congressional intent to secure the
availability of the technology for legitimate users.45 This section
discusses which uses Congress labeled as legitimate and
illegitimate.
1. Legitimate Uses of Caller ID Spoofing
There are many legitimate users of caller ID spoofing,
including business professionals who use the technology to prevent
their personal numbers from becoming public and call centers that
project incoming phone numbers on their outgoing lines.46 Doctors
2010, 9:11 AM) (on file with author).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
E.g., 153 CONG. REC. E1286 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Green).
45
See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H3386, H3387 (daily ed. June 6, 2006)
(statement of Rep. Markey) (stating the importance of protecting legitimate
uses); 156 CONG. REC. H2522, H2523 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010) (statement of
Rep. Boucher) (asserting that domestic violence survivors do not intend to
deceive when using caller ID technology, so their use would not be criminalized
under H.R. 1258).
46
See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H252224 (statement of Rep. Boucher); 152
CONG. REC. H3386, H3387 (statement of Rep. Markey). By spoofing,
telemarketing companies are able to provide the recipients of their calls with a
viable return number. The Truth in Caller ID Act: Hearing on S. 704 Before the

HATFIELD - FINAL.DOC

834

5/9/2011 4:15 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

and other professionals, who must make occasional phone calls
from home, use the service to project their office numbers,
informing their clients that they are calling while keeping their
private numbers undisclosed.47 Teltech Systems, Inc. (“Teltech”)48
reports that the service is also useful for journalists who want to
keep their personal numbers private.49 Additional uses of caller ID
spoofing include “seeking criminals who have jumped bail,
tracking down child support payment deadbeats, . . . providing
whistleblowers anonymity in making disclosures,”50 and
facilitating debt collection.51 Even Congress members use the
technology so that outgoing calls display the office’s main number
instead of the numbers of their personal lines.52
Arguably, the most socially valuable use of spoofing
technology is to protect domestic violence shelters and victims,
and this has long been a congressional priority when dealing with
caller ID technology.53 In 1995, the FCC passed regulations
requiring that individual users have the capability to block their

S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 110th Cong. 5 (2007) [hereinafter
Cerasale Statement] (statement of Jerry Cerasale, Senior Vice-President, Direct
Marketing Association). If a consumer attempted to return a telemarketing call
to an outgoing line, the number would be busy. Id.
47
See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H6257, H6258 (daily ed. June 12, 2007)
(statement of Rep. Markey); Cerasale Statement, supra note 46.
48
Teltech is the parent company of SpoofCard, the largest caller ID
spoofing company. Thomas, supra note 29.
49
Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment at 3, Teltech Sys., Inc. v. McCollum, No. 08-61664-CIVMartinez-Brown (S.D. Fla. 2009).
50
Drew Douglas, Marketers Challenge Constitutionality of Florida’s
Caller ID Spoofing Ban, 9 COMPUTER TECH. L. REP. (BNA) 550 (Nov. 7, 2008).
The TICIDA contains a law enforcement exception, ensuring that law
enforcement may legally continue to use caller ID spoofing. Truth in Caller ID
Act of 2009, S. 30, 111th Cong. § 2(e)(3)(ii) (2009).
51
The Truth in Caller ID Act: Hearing on S. 704 Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 110th Cong. 5 (2007) [hereinafter Monteith
Statement] (statement of Kris Monteith, Chief of Enforcement Bureau, FCC).
52
153 CONG. REC. H6257, H6258 (daily ed. June 12, 2007) (statement of
Rep. Markey).
53
See id.
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personal information when making calls by dialing *67.54 Many
states introduced regulations that required blocking options to be
provided free of charge, partially out of concern for domestic
violence victims.55 Thus, government officials have consistently
tried to minimize the likelihood that caller ID could deliver the
location of a domestic violence victim or shelter to her abuser.56
By using caller ID spoofing, victims are able maintain contact with
loved ones safely.
2. Illegitimate Uses of Caller ID Spoofing
Caller ID spoofing also has many nefarious uses.57 Proponents
of caller ID spoofing legislation focused on particularly egregious
examples of illegitimate uses during debates.58 This section
discusses the four nefarious uses of spoofing technology most
54

47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(b) (2006).
Carriers must arrange their CPN-based services, and billing practices,
in such a manner that when a caller requests that the CPN not be
passed, a carrier may not reveal that caller’s number or name, nor may
the carrier use the number or name to allow the called party to contact
the calling party.

Id.
55

Telephone Firms Give in on Caller-ID Blocking, NEWSDAY, Oct. 9,
1990, at 41; see also Timothy C. Barmann, Cox Communications Cancels Plans
to Charge for Privacy Service, PROVIDENCE J., Jan 9, 2001.
56
See, e.g., Bob Wyss, Wires Crossed in Caller ID Blocks Phone
Companies Promise Privacy, but Failures Abound, PROVIDENCE J., March 5,
1995, at 1A; Telephone Firms Give in on Caller-ID Blocking, supra note 55.
Opponents of caller ID forcefully argued that the service made customers
vulnerable by releasing their private information without regard to whether the
customer wanted to enroll in the service, and that this was particularly
dangerous in the context of domestic violence shelters and victims. Telephone
Firms Give in on Caller-ID Blocking, supra note 55.
57
The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006: Hearing H.R. 5126 Before the
Subcomm. On Telecomms. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 109th Cong. 24 (2006) (statement of Lance James, Chief
Technology Officer, Secure Science Corp.). It is estimated that in excess of
seventy-five percent of spoofed calls are made for malicious purposes. Id. at 25.
58
See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H2522–24 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010) (statement
of Rep. Boucher).
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often cited by proponents during debates on the TICIDA: fraud,59
swatting,60 harassment,61 and political harassment.62
i. Fraud
Caller ID spoofing is used to perpetrate fraud in two ways: to
make victims believe a spoofer is a trusted entity or to make a
trusted entity believe a spoofer is his victim.63 In other words,
caller ID spoofing can be used either to trick a victim into
revealing confidential information, often called phishing, or to
verify identity fraudulently when calling an institutional entity.64
Phishers use their fraudulently gained information to transfer
money from bank accounts, to sell credit card numbers to third
parties, or to apply for credit cards or loans in their victim’s
name.65 Microsoft research estimates that phishers stole over $61
million in 2007.66
Traditionally, phishers used spoofed websites or emails to trick
users into entering confidential usernames and passwords.67 Now,
phishers can also use spoofed caller ID information.68 In Sterling,
59

See id.
See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S170, S173 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) (statement
of Sen. Nelson).
61
See, e.g., Native American Methamphetamine Enforcement, The Animal
Fighting Prohibition Enforcement Act of 2007, and the Preventing Harassment
Through Outbound Number Enforcement (PHONE) Act of 2007: Hearing on
H.R. 545, H.R.137, & H.R. 740 Before Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, &
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 27 (2007)
[hereinafter Sabin Statement] (statement of Barry Sabin, Deputy Asst. Att’y
Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
62
See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H2522, H2524 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010)
(statement of Rep. Stearns).
63
See generally 2 RICHARD RAYSMAN & PETER BROWN, COMPUTER LAW:
DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING FORMS § 15.05 (2010).
64
Id.
65
Jeremy Feigelson & Camille Calman, Liability for the Costs of Phishing
and Information Theft, 13 no. 10 J. INTERNET L., Apr. 2010, at 16.
66
Id. at 17.
67
RAYSMAN & BROWN, supra note 63.
68
S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 1–2 (2007).
60
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Michigan, for example, residents received phone calls appearing to
originate from the local courthouse.69 Victims were told they had
“missed jury duty” and they would be arrested if they did not
immediately provide their Social Security number.70
Caller ID spoofing is also used to fraudulently verify identity to
gain access to confidential accounts.71 For example, Western
Union has proceeded with cash transfers after credit card thieves
spoofed the credit card holder’s caller ID information, making the
call appear to have been placed by the individual whose identity
was stolen.72
Voicemail hacking is another example of fraudulently
verifying identity.73 Many voicemail companies provide users
access to their mailbox via caller ID verification without requiring
a password.74 This security flaw was famously exposed in 2006,
when SpoofCard75 suspended over fifty accounts, including
socialite Paris Hilton’s, because of suspected voicemail hacking
activity.76 Notwithstanding the account suspensions, the Los
Angeles District Attorney investigated voicemail hacking in 2008
after receiving complaints.77 Ultimately, SpoofCard’s parent
company agreed to a permanent injunction, requiring that it may
no longer advertise that it is “legal in all 50 states, if that is not the

69

Id.
Id.
71
See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S170, S173 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) (statement
of Sen. Nelson).
72
S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 2.
73
See Tom Gilroy, Software Firm, Two Cell Phone Providers Settle DA’s
Allegations of Illegal ‘Spoofing,’ 9 COMPUTER TECH. L. REP. (BNA) 616 (Dec.
19, 2008).
74
Id.
75
Spoofcard is the largest spoofing company, with over three million
customers. Thomas, supra note 29.
76
Robert McMillan, Paris Hilton Accused of Voice-Mail Hacking,
INFOWORLD (Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/
paris-hilton-accused-voice-mail-hacking-457. Many gossip columns reported
that Hilton used the technology to hack into actress Lindsay Lohan’s voicemail,
although Hilton’s spokesman denied the allegations. Id.
77
Gilroy, supra note 73.
70
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case . . . .”78 In addition, T-Mobile and AT&T were enjoined from
advertising that pin-free voicemail access was a secure method of
verification.79 Despite these efforts, voicemail hacking still
occurs.80 In April 2010, the former publicity director for Dolce &
Gabbana, Ali Wise, faced up to four years in prison but instead
pleaded guilty to hacking into at least four people’s voicemail
accounts, listening to and deleting their messages.81
ii. Swatting
Swatting occurs when a spoofed call is placed to an emergency
number.82 The caller claims that an emergency is taking place at
the location of the spoofed number.83 This process is known as
swatting because the goal is to cause the deployment of a SWAT
team to the location from which the call appears to originate.84 In
2009, for example, police caught a group of men who had prank
called over sixty cities, claiming that hostage situations were in
progress.85 The scheme cost the cities over $250,000 in emergency
response expenses, claimed over 250 victims, and injured two.86
Emergency service prank calls have serious implications. The
calls can overload the emergency response system itself, and can
prevent police officers from responding to legitimate calls.87
78

Id.
Id.
80
Laura Italiano, PR Princess Ali Wise Pleads Guilty to Felony Charge,
N.Y. POST, Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/
charge_princess_ali_wise_agrees_NQ0hSsbdOjUH4cA4n0mLkO.
81
Id. Ms. Wise hacked into one victim’s voicemail over 337 times. Id.
82
Steve La, Prank Calls to SWAT No Joke to L.A. County Sheriffs, LA
WEEKLY BLOGS (Aug. 30, 2010, 12:10 PM), http://blogs.laweekly.com/informer
/2010/08/prank_calls_to_swat_is_no_joke.php.
83
Id.
84
Guadalupe Santana Martinez Sentencing Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/usao/txn/PressRel08/martinez_
guadalupe_swat_sen_pr.html.
85
Thomas, supra note 29.
86
Id.
87
See Deanna Lambert, County Sees Increase in Kids’ Prank 911 Calls,
WSMV-TV (Dec. 31, 2009, 10:31 PM), http://www.wsmv.com/news/22094768/
79
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Moreover, some jurisdictions have a policy that police must
investigate every serious call placed to 911,88 and some
jurisdictions treat every call received as an emergency.89 Anytime
the police respond to an emergency, first responders race to reach
the scene as quickly as possible, placing the lives of those in the
community, as well as the responders themselves, in danger.90
iii. Harassment
Many commercial caller ID spoofing companies claim they are
intended for entertainment via prank calls to friends, but the
service is often used to prank call strangers or make threatening
and demeaning calls to enemies.91 Caller ID spoofing can aid
harassers and stalkers by tricking a victim into answering a call.92
In 2009, for example, a man called three women in the middle of
the night claiming that he was inside their houses watching them.93
He called the women’s cell phones and spoofed their home
numbers so that his victims believed he was calling from within
detail.html.
88
Id.
89
See Hailee Lampert, Two Charged After Prank 911 Calls, WLKY.COM
(Feb. 26, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://www.wlky.com/r/22677032/detail.html.
90
I-Team: Prank 911 Calls Endanger Residents, Police, WBALTV.COM
(July 30, 2009, 8:25 AM), http://www.wbaltv.com/r/20214644/detail.html. A
Baltimore policeman stated, “[e]very time we drive lights-and-siren, that raises
the potential of harm to the officers themselves and other motorists on the road,
for accidents. It poses a very significant risk to public safety.” Id. In Texas, a
fire engine, worth an estimated $450,000, flipped over while responding to a
prank 911 call, injuring four firefighters. Michael N. Marcus, 911 Prank Call
Injures Four Firefighters, 911 WACKOS (Feb. 3, 2008, 5:31 AM),
http://911wackos.blogspot.com/2008/02/911-prank-call-injures-four.html.
91
See PHONEGANGSTER.COM, http://www.phonegangster.com/ (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011) (claiming their services are intended for “fun”); see also Real
Stories/Uses, SPOOFCARD, http://www.spoofcard.com/stories (last visited Feb.
4, 2011) (advertising testimonials from satisfied customers who were able to use
the service to trick their friends).
92
Sabin Statement, supra note 61.
93
Women Terrorized by Calls Appearing to Come From Home, NBC
PHILA. (Dec. 17, 2008, 7:45 AM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/
local-beat/Women-Terrorized-By-Calls-Appearing-To-Come-From-Home.html.
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the house.94
iv. Political Harassment
Legitimate political “robocalling” is “one of the most-used
political campaign tools.”95 However, Congress is concerned about
the increasing use of political robocalls made with the intent to
trick voters or prevent them from voting.96 Caller ID spoofing is
abused to make it appear that one candidate is placing a phone call,
when in fact his opponent is using the call to annoy or confuse
voters.97 This happened to democrat Scott Kleeb, who ran to
represent the 3rd District of Nebraska in the U.S. House of
Representatives in 2006.98 Automated calls were placed with
spoofed caller ID information, making it look as if Kleeb’s
campaign placed the phone calls.99 Voters received the calls
overnight and sometimes repeatedly.100 Mr. Kleeb is not the lone
victim of this strategy. In South Carolina, police arrested a local
Republican for purportedly organizing spoofed political
robocalls.101 Spoofing made the calls appear to be from the
democratic candidate’s office.102
94

Id.
Jason C. Miller, Note, Regulating Robocalls: Are Automated Calls the
Sound of, or a Threat to, Democracy?, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
213, 215 (2009).
96
153 CONG. REC. E1286 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Rep.
Green). Automated phone call devices can place as many as 100,000 calls in one
hour. Miller, supra note 95, at 215. One automated phone call company reports
they are able to call “10 to 20 percent of the U.S. population on a single day.”
Id. at 216.
97
Spoofer Calls Don’t Leave Folks Laughing, LINCOLN J. STAR, June 11,
2007, http://journalstar.com/news/opinion/editorial/article_3ce5eb06-803355b48151-be15654b2315.html.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Karen Daily, Charges Brought in Robocall Case, AIKEN STANDARD,
Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.aikenstandard.com/local/1216Allen.
102
Id. The woman was charged with unlawful use of a telephone under
state law. Id.
95
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There is anecdotal evidence that spoofed robocalls are effective
at motivating voters to change their vote.103 For example, in New
Hampshire, the National Republican Congressional Committee
placed repetitive robocalls, late at night, designed to appear to be
from the democratic candidate.104 The local newspaper printed a
letter from an angry voter who stated she would not vote for the
democratic candidate due to the annoying calls.105
III. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES
Increased concern over the damage caused by illegitimate uses
of caller ID spoofing technology has triggered legislative responses
at both the state and the federal level.106 Four states have passed
anti-spoofing legislation.107 Congress considered six different
versions of the Truth in Caller ID Act and three different versions
of the Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number
Enforcement Act since 2006.108 This section discusses the viability
of the states’ approaches to anti-spoofing legislation and introduces
the federal legislation.

103

Miller, supra note 95, at 221.
Id. These calls did not use caller ID spoofing; rather, it was the content
of the calls that was misleading. Id.
105
Id.
106
156 CONG. REC. H2522, H2523 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010) (statement of
Rep. Boucher); 152 CONG. REC. S3422, S3423 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2006)
(statement of Sen. Bill Nelson).
107
Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, and Oklahoma have passed antispoofing legislation. See infra Part III.A.
108
Truth in Caller ID Act of 2010, H.R. 1258, 111th Cong. (2010); Truth
in Caller ID Act of 2009, S. 30, 111th Cong. (2009); Preventing Harassment
Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act of 2009, H.R. 1110, 111th Cong.
(2009); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, S. 704, 110th Cong. (2008); Preventing
Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 740,
110th Cong. (2007); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, H.R. 251, 110th Cong.
(2007); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, S. 2630, 109th Cong. (2006); Preventing
Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act, H.R. 5304, 109th
Cong. (2006); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, H.R. 5126, 109th Cong. (2006).
104
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A. State Legislation

Several states have proposed or enacted anti-spoofing
legislation.109 Louisiana’s anti-spoofing bill provides a private
right of action and enables the district attorney to “recover a civil
penalty”110 when “a caller . . . knowingly insert(s) false
information into a caller identification system with the intent to
mislead, defraud or deceive the recipient of a call.”111 Oklahoma’s
Anti-Caller ID Spoofing Act and Mississippi’s Caller ID AntiSpoofing Act also outlaw the knowing falsification of caller ID
information to mislead, defraud or deceive.112 In October 2008,
Florida enacted the Caller ID Anti-Spoofing Act (“the Florida
Act”), which outlawed spoofing to “deceive, defraud, or
mislead.”113 By using the term “mislead,” these statutes have the
practical effect of outlawing all caller ID spoofing and rejecting the
concept of legitimate uses.114 Since the essence of caller ID
spoofing is the ability to mislead called parties about the
originating phone number, all uses become illegal under these
statutes.115
In 2008, Teltech Systems, Inc.116 filed a complaint alleging,
among other things, that the Florida Act violated the Commerce
Clause.117 The Southern District of Florida agreed and granted

109

Stolar & Gall, supra note 12.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1741.5 (West 2010).
111
Id. § 51:1741.4.
112
MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-3-805 (West 2010); OKL. STAT. tit. 15, § 776.23
(West 2010). In 2009, Idaho considered, but ultimately did not enact, a similar
anti-spoofing bill. Anti-Caller ID Spoofing Act, S. 1051, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Idaho 2009), http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2009/S1051.pdf.
113
FLA. STAT. § 817.487 (West 2010).
114
Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 49, at 2.
115
Id.
116
See supra note 48 (discussing Teltech).
117
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 17–19 Teltech Sys., Inc. v. McCollum, No. 08-61664-CIVMartinez-Brown (S.D. Fla. July 16, 2009) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397
U.S. 137 (1970)).
110

HATFIELD - FINAL.DOC

5/9/2011 4:15 PM

Phoney Business

843

Teltech’s motion for summary judgment.118 Teltech argued that
because of cellular phones and VoIP services, it could not know
the location of the called parties.119 For example, if a Teltech client
in New York spoofed a call to a California number, the called
party could be in fact located in Florida, rendering the New York
client liable under the Florida Act.120 Thus, Teltech argued it could
not conduct its business in any state without fear of violating the
Florida Act.121 The court concluded that the Florida Act had “the
practical effect of regulating commerce that occurs wholly outside
the state of Florida” in violation of the Commerce Clause.122
Notwithstanding Teltech, states have continued to pass
legislation similar to the Florida Act.123 It is likely these statutes
will be challenged in federal court,124 but the outcome is unclear.
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on an appeal
from a Washington state court ruling that a Washington anti-email
spoofing statute, similar in effect to the Florida act, did not violate
the Commerce Clause.125 The Florida court did not find this
persuasive in Teltech, but other Districts might.126 The
constitutional uncertainty of the existing state anti-spoofing
118

See Teltech, No. 08-61664-CIV-Martinez-Brown.
Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 49, at 4. Likewise, simply blocking Florida area
codes would not be sufficient to guarantee that no calls went into or originated
in Florida. Id. at 5.
120
Teltech, No. 08-61664-CIV-Martinez-Brown, at 16.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1741.4 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. §
77-3-805 (West 2010).
124
E-mail from Mark Del Bianco, Counsel, Teltech Sys., Inc., to author
(Nov. 30, 2010, 10:04 AM) (on file with author). In November of 2010, Teltech
filed a constitutional challenge to the Mississippi Caller ID Anti-Spoofing Act in
the Southern District of Mississippi. Id.
125
Heckel v. Washington, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 997 (2001).
126
See Teltech, No. 08-61664-CIV-Martinez-Brown; see generally
Defendant’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 5 Teltech, No. 08-61664-CIV-Martinez-Brown, 2009 WL
1614869.
119
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statutes, in addition to the small number of states that have enacted
legislation, indicate that uniform and comprehensive regulation of
caller ID spoofing must be accomplished at the federal level.
B. Federal Legislation
1. The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009
On April 6, 2006, the long journey of the Truth in Caller ID
Acts began.127 Despite six attempts to pass this legislation, three in
the House and three in the Senate,128 the TICIDA did not pass both
chambers until December 15, 2010.129 On December 22, 2010,
President Barack Obama signed the bill and it became Public Law
111-331.130 The TICIDA amends section 227 of the
Communications Act of 1934 (“the Act”), Title 47 of the U.S.
Code, to outlaw certain uses of caller ID spoofing.131
The TICIDA forbids any person “to cause any caller
identification service to knowingly transmit misleading or
inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to
defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of
value . . . .”132 Caller ID service is defined as “any service or
device designed to provide the user of the service or device with
the telephone number of, or other information regarding the
origination of, a call made using a telecommunications service or
IP-enabled voice service.”133

127

Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, H.R. 5126, 109th Cong. (2006).
Truth in Caller ID Act of 2010, H.R. 1258, 111th Cong. (2010); Truth
in Caller ID Act of 2009, S. 30, 111th Cong. (2009); Truth in Caller ID Act of
2007, S. 704, 110th Cong. (2008); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2007, H.R. 251,
110th Cong. (2007); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, H.R. 5126, 109th Cong
(2006); Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, S. 2630, 109th Cong. (2006).
129
Id.
130
Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status, THOMAS, http://www.
thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s.00030: (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
131
S. 30.
132
Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(1) (West 2010).
133
§ 227(e)(8)(B). Accordingly, the TICIDA regulates VoIP calls, as well
as traditional phone calls. § 227(e)(1).
128
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Generally, a willful and knowing initial violation of the Act is
punishable by “a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment
for a term not exceeding one year, or both . . . .”134 A second
offense is punishable “by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or both.”135 The
TICIDA provides the FCC with enforcement power;136 however, if
the FCC determines that criminal prosecution is warranted, then it
shall notify the United States Attorney, who shall bring the
appropriate charges in the proper court.137 Within six months, the
FCC is to “prescribe regulations to implement” the TICIDA’s
provisions138 and report to Congress “whether additional
legislation is necessary to prohibit the provision of inaccurate
caller identification information in technologies that are successor
or replacement technologies to telecommunications or IP-enabled
voice service.”139
The TICIDA provides specific civil and criminal penalties.140
A specific civil forfeiture penalty, in addition to the general
penalty under the Act, is “not to exceed $10,000 for each violation,
or three times that amount for each day of continuing
violation . . . .”141 In contrast, a specific criminal fine under the
TICIDA, of “not more than $10,000 for each violation, or three
times that amount for each day of continuing violation,” is “in
lieu” of the general fines imposed under the Act.142 However, the
general criminal penalties under the Act, of imprisonment or a
penalty of both fine and imprisonment, may be imposed in addition
to the specific criminal fine.143 Lastly, the TICIDA authorizes
independent state enforcement via civil action in federal district
134

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 2010).
Id.
136
§ 227(e)(3)(A).
137
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 2010).
138
§ 227(e)(3)(A).
139
§ 227(e)(4).
140
See § 227(e)(5).
141
§ 227(e)(5)(A).
142
§ 227(e)(5)(B). Criminal penalties are imposed for “willful and knowing
violation” of the TICIDA. Id.
143
Id.
135

HATFIELD - FINAL.DOC

846

5/9/2011 4:15 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

court.144 After the FCC receives notice of the proceeding, it may,
however, intervene in the state action.145
2. Past Proposals for Federal Legislation
The Preventing Harassment through Outbound Number
Enforcement Act (“PHONE Act”) was an alternative approach to
caller ID spoofing regulation proposed in the House.146 There have
been three House versions of the PHONE Act, of which the first
was introduced in 2006.147 The most recent version, the PHONE
Act of 2009, passed the House on December 16, 2009, with a
resounding 418 “yeas” to one “nay,”148 yet the bill died in the
Senate.149 Unlike the TICIDA, which amends Title 47 of the U.S.
Code, the PHONE Act would have amended Title 18 by adding
section 1041, “Caller ID Spoofing.”150 Section 1041(a) proposed to
outlaw:
144

§ 227(e)(6)(A). The TICIDA provides:
[t]he chief legal officer of a State, or any other State officer authorized
by law to bring actions on behalf of the residents of a State, may bring
a civil action, as parens patriae, on behalf of the residents of the State in
the appropriate district court . . . to impose the civil penalties for
violation of this subsection.

Id.
145

§ 227(e)(6)(C).
Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act
of 2009, H.R. 1110, 111th Cong. (2009). The most recent version, the PHONE
Act, passed the House on December 16, 2009. Library of Congress, Bill
Summary & Status, THOMAS, http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d
111:2:./temp/~bdq2yI::|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=111|, (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011). There have been three House versions of the PHONE Act, of
which the first was introduced in 2006. H.R. 1110; Preventing Harassment
Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 740, 110th Cong.
(2007); Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act,
H.R. 5304, 109th Cong. (2006).
147
H.R. 1110; H.R. 740; H.R. 5304.
148
Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status, THOMAS, http://www.
thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d111:2:./temp/~bdq2yI::|/home/LegislativeData.
php?n=BSS;c=111|, (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
149
Id.
150
H.R. 1110.
146
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knowingly [using] or [providing] to another (1) false caller
ID information with intent wrongfully to obtain anything of
value; or (2) caller ID information pertaining to an actual
person or other entity without that person’s or entity’s
consent and with intent to deceive any person or other
entity about the identity of the caller . . . .151
A violation of subsection (a)(1) would have been punishable by
a “[fine] under this title or imprison[ment] not more than 5 years,
or both . . . .”152 A violation of subsection (a)(2) would have been
punishable by the same terms but with a one year maximum term
of imprisonment.153 In addition, any person convicted under
section 1041 would have been subject to forfeiture of “(A) any
property, real or personal, constituting or traceable to gross
proceeds obtained from such offense; and (B) any equipment,
software or other technology used or intended to be used to
commit or to facilitate the commission of such offense . . . .”154
IV. THE TRUTH IN CALLER ID ACT OF 2009 DOES NOT SOLVE THE
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ILLEGITIMATE CALLER ID SPOOFING
Although the TICIDA specifically outlaws illegitimate uses of
caller ID spoofing, such legislation does not sufficiently respond to
the issues caused by the continued availability of the technology.
The TICIDA’s weaknesses will encourage illegitimate users, thus
undermining those who seek to use caller ID spoofing for valid
purposes. Further response is necessary because caller ID spoofing
provides valuable and legitimate services to society that ought to
be preserved, as Congress repeatedly recognized during floor
debates on the TICIDA.155
151

Id.
Id.
153
Id.
154
H.R. 1110 §§ (d)(1)(A)–(B).
155
See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. H8378 (daily ed. Dec 15, 2010) (statement of
Rep. Engel) (“I introduced the bill [inter alia] to protect legitimate uses of caller
ID technology.”); 156 CONG. REC. H2522 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2010); Cerasale
Statement, supra note 46; 152 CONG. REC. H9192, H9193 (daily ed. Dec. 8,
2006) (statement of Rep. Scott).
152
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For many legitimate users, caller ID spoofing is the best way to
keep caller ID private since the development of two new services
has severely limited the effectiveness of *67 blocking.156 One of
these services is anonymous call rejection.157 This service
intercepts incoming calls from blocked or private numbers, which
prevents the phone from ringing and instead notifies the caller that
the number dialed does not receive anonymous calls.158 This is
problematic for domestic violence shelters and victims because
courts sometimes order domestic violence victims to maintain
contact with their ex-spouse to facilitate child custody
arraignments.159 If an abuser utilizes anonymous call rejection,
caller ID spoofing becomes an indispensible tool for ensuring
contact while protecting the location of the victim.160
The second new service is TrapCall.161 This controversial
service reveals blocked phone numbers, which raises privacy
concerns for legitimate users.162 When a TrapCall subscriber
receives a blocked call, he can reject it.163 TrapCall then re-routes
the incoming call to an 800 number, revealing the caller’s ANI.164
The call is then sent back to the TrapCall subscriber’s mobile
phone with the private number displayed on the subscriber’s caller

156

Knight Statement, supra note 26, at 23.
Id.
158
Fact Sheet 19: Caller ID and My Privacy, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs19-cid.htm#18 (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011).
159
Elizabeth Olson, A Technological Boost to the Cat-and-Mouse Game
Between Callers and the Called, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, http://www.ny
times.com/2009/03/15/us/15call.html?_r=2.
160
S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 2 (2007).
161
Olson, supra note 159. Teltech launched TrapCall in 2009. Id. The
service is currently available to AT&T, Verizon Wireless, Sprint, and T-Mobile
subscribers as a free download. Frequently Asked Questions, TRAPCALL,
http://www.trapcall.com/faq (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
162
Olson, supra note 159. It is argued that the service increases privacy and
prevents harassment by allowing individuals to know the identity of callers. Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. While the call is re-routed, the caller continues to hear normal
ringing. Id. See supra Part II.A for an explanation of ANI.
157
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ID.165 Caller ID spoofing is the only way to prevent TrapCall from
revealing a private number since spoofing alters both the CPN and
the ANI, protecting the private caller’s information.166
Notwithstanding the important privacy gains caller ID spoofing
provides, the grave personal and public costs of illegitimate uses
require a comprehensive federal response. The TICIDA fails to
provide this.167 Unfortunately, if the TICIDA fails to curb
illegitimate uses, Congress might decide to amend the TICIDA to
adopt the states’ approach of caller ID regulation, banning the
technology outright.
In order to cure the deficiencies of the TICIDA and maintain
the viability of caller ID spoofing, the Department of Justice,
Congress, and the FCC should take a number of additional steps.
First, federal prosecutors should creatively prosecute illegitimate
users by charging the spoofer with the federal crime that best fits
the illegitimate activities and provides the highest level of
deterrence. Second, the FCC should notify Congress that text
message caller ID spoofing will become a successor technology if
Congress does not amend the TICIDA to define the term “call” as
voice and text calls. Last, the FCC should enact regulations to
facilitate law enforcement tracing of spoofed calls and create a DoNot-Spoof list.
A. The Department of Justice Should Use Creative Prosecution
Methods to Enhance Deterrence
During floor debates on the TICIDA, Congress members
complained that spoofers could use the service legally to realize
illegitimate ends.168 Thus, it was argued, the TICIDA’s criminal
proscriptions were necessary to close that gap.169 While the
TICIDA now provides a direct method for federal prosecution of
caller ID spoofing with the intent to “defraud, cause harm, or
165

Olson, supra note 159.
Id.
167
See Part II.B.2 (explaining illegitimate uses).
168
See generally 155 CONG. REC. S170, S173 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009)
(statement of Mr. Nelson) (stating that many believe that this service is legal).
169
Id. at S173–174.
166
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wrongfully obtain anything of value,”170 illegitimate caller ID
spoofing was potentially prosecutable under numerous federal laws
that provided steeper penalties than the TICIDA. The widespread
use of caller ID spoofing technology for illegitimate ends suggests
that effective deterrence requires vigorous and creative
prosecution, which seeks to enhance the potential criminal
penalties that illegitimate users face. Consequently, while
prosecutors should charge those who use caller ID spoofing for
swatting or political harassment under the TICIDA, for other
illegitimate uses, it will be more effective to charge a spoofer
under alternative federal statutes. The remainder of this section
suggests which laws prosecutors should use when seeking to deter
illegitimate users of caller ID spoofing, and the specific contexts in
which these laws should be used.
1. Fraud Prosecution Methods
Committing fraud is generally illegal under many federal
statutes that carry longer maximum penalties and larger maximum
fines than the TICIDA, and those statutes should be used instead of
the TICIDA to prosecute spoofing when appropriate.171 The facts
of the fraudulent scheme will determine which federal law
applies.172
If the spoofer perpetrated fraud on a bank or financial
institution, then the spoofer should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344, making him subject to “a fine of not more than $100,000,
imprison[ment] of not more than 30 years, or both.”173 Otherwise,
the spoofer should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which
covers wire fraud generally.174 Section 1343 provides that a party
who “devises a scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property . . . by means of wire . . . shall be fined under
170

Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(1) (West 2010).
See generally Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029 (West
2010); Communications Act Amendments, 1952, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1343, 1344
(West 2010).
172
See generally §§ 1029, 1343, 1344.
173
§ 1344.
174
§ 1343.
171
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this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”175
While § 1343 should be used to prosecute interstate phishing
schemes accomplished by spoofing,176 by its terms, it applies only
to “communication in interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”177
Furthermore, some courts have held that where all parties are
residents of the same state, “all telephone calls are presumed to be
intrastate and, absent any indication otherwise . . . wire fraud is not
[present].”178 The TICIDA avoids this loophole since it does not
have an interstate activity requirement.179 Yet, the maximum
penalty under the TICIDA is drastically lower than the maximum
penalty under § 1343, thus providing a windfull to the intrastate
spoofer charged under the TICIDA. Consequently, intrastate
spoofers should be charged under state wire fraud and identity theft
statutes180 that have higher maximum penalties when available.
If the spoofer used caller ID information as an access device to
commit fraud, the spoofer should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §
1029.181 Section 1029(a)(1) makes it illegal to “knowingly and
with intent to defraud produce, use, or traffic in one or more
counterfeit access devices.”182 An access device is defined as any

175

Id.
Black’s law dictionary defines a “scheme” as “[a]n artful plot or plan,
[usually] to deceive others.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
177
Communications Act Amendments, 1952, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West
2010). In addition, “money or property [must] be the object of the defendant’s
scheme to defraud.” United States v. Martin, 411 F. Supp. 2d 370, 373
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). It is therefore possible that § 1343 does not include schemes to
obtain personal information. Lastly, to be liable under § 1343, the use of the
wires “must at least be ‘incident to an essential part of the scheme.’” Id. at 374
(quoting United States v. Altman, 48 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis
omitted)).
178
Mathon v. Feldstein, 303 F. Supp. 2d 317, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(quoting McCoy v. Goldberg, 748 F. Supp. 146, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1990))
(emphasis added).
179
Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2010).
180
Christine Mumford, Spam Gives Way to Data Breach, Phishing in
Contest for State Legislators’ Attention, 8 COMPUTER TECH. L. REP. (BNA) 56
(Feb. 2, 2007).
181
Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029 (West 2010).
182
§ 1029(a)(1).
176
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“code, account number, . . . mobile identification number, personal
identification number, . . . or other means of account access that
can be used . . . to obtain money, goods, services, or any other
thing of value . . . .”183 Caller ID information is a unique number
that the spoofer uses to obtain things of value in phishing schemes
and in false identity verifications.184 In a phishing scheme, the
spoofer uses caller ID to access personal information, which the
spoofer can sell or use to obtain goods or cash.185 When it
fraudulently verifies identity, caller ID is an account number that
leads directly to the spoofer obtaining money, or valuable
confidential information.186 Thus, § 1029 should be charged when
phishers spoof false caller ID numbers to obtain things of value.
Alternatively, if the phisher pretends to be a trusted entity, he
can be prosecuted according to the mask he wears or the identity of
his victims. Those who falsely assume the identity of a government
official should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 912, which carries
a criminal penalty of up to three years imprisonment.187 If caller ID
spoofing is used in connection with a fraudulent telemarketing
scheme, the spoofer should be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2326,
which would subject him to an enhanced penalty of up to five
years imprisonment.188 If during that scheme he victimized “ten or
more persons over the age of 55; or targeted persons over the age
of 55,” § 2326 provides “imprison[ment] for a term of up to 10
183

§ 1029(e)(1).
See Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 49, at 2 (noting that the government had
admitted “that on a telephone call the Caller ID string is akin to the identity of
the caller”).
185
RAYSMAN & BROWN, supra note 63.
186
See S. REP. NO. 110-234, at 2 (2007).
187
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 912 (West 2010).
Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee
acting under the authority of the United States or any department,
agency or officer thereof, and . . . in such pretended character demands
or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Id.
188
Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. §
2326(1) (West 2010).
184
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years.”189
Finally, voicemail hacking is prosecutable under either the
Stored Communications Act190 or the Wiretap Act191 depending on
the actions taken by the spoofer once he accesses the voicemail
system.192 If the spoofer merely accesses the system, then he
should be prosecuted under the Stored Communications Act,
which provides a maximum penalty of five years in prison.193 If
however the spoofer also records copies of messages or deletes
messages from the system, he has then intercepted
communications and should be prosecuted under the Wiretap Act,
which provides for penalties of up to five years in prison.194
2. Swatting Prosecution Methods
The TICIDA is the most effective method of prosecuting
swatting. Before the TICIDA, there was no federal statute that
outlawed spoofed 911 calls.195 However, certain states had
189

Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. §
2326(2) (West 2010). A Minnesota report stated that caller ID spoofing
“provide[d] convincing support to criminals” in a fraudulent telemarketing
lottery scheme. MINN. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, STAFF BRIEFING PAPER, Docket No.
P=999/C-08-1391, 1 (2010).
190
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701
makes it illegal to “intentionally access without authorization a facility through
which an electronic communication service is provided” and “thereby [obtain],
[alter], or [prevent] authorized access to a wire or electronic communication.” §
2701(a).
191
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. §
2511, outlaws the interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communications. The section provides that any person who “intentionally
intercepts, . . . any wire, oral, or electronic communication . . . shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” Id.
192
United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing
the complexity of both acts and determining that the best approach is one that
determines their applicability based upon whether the defendant merely accesses
the system or accesses and records or intercepts messages from the system).
193
Id.; § 2701(b)(1).
194
Smith, 155 F.3d at 1058; § 2511(4)(a).
195
See generally Rana Sampson, Guide 19: Misuse and Abuse of 911,
PROBLEM ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE 13 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of
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promulgated statutes that specifically outlawed fake, false, or
fraudulent 911 calls.196 For example, in Oklahoma and Georgia,
false 911 calls are first-degree misdemeanors.197 Rhode Island
imposes a maximum fine of $1,000 dollars and/or a maximum
sentence of one-year imprisonment for knowingly making false
reports to emergency services.198 The offense became a felony in
Illinois in response to public outcry after a police officer’s car
flipped over as he sped to the scene of a false 911 report of five
dead bodies.199 However, the monetary penalties under the
TICIDA are considerably higher than under state laws.
Consequently, prosecutors should charge swatters under the
TICIDA.
3. Harassment Prosecution Methods
Congress first enacted legislation on annoying or harassing
phone calls in 1968.200 These and other federal statutes provide
more stringent penalties than the TICIDA, and consequently
Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs. Ser. No. 19, 2004), Aug. 2004, available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/e07042423_web.pdf.
196
There are also non-specific statutes under which swatters may be
prosecuted. Alexis Stevens, 7th Graders Arrested After 911 Prank Calls,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 24, 2010, http://www.ajc.com/news/cobb/7thgraders-arrested-after-401061.html. For example, two juveniles were charged
with “transmission of false public alarm and disruption of a public school” after
making prank 911 calls on school grounds. Id. In New York, a teenager was
charged with disorderly conduct after placing prank 911 calls. Ben Muessig,
Teen Who Made Prank 911 Call Has History of False Reports, GOTHAMIST
(March 1, 2010, 4:57 PM), http://gothamist.com/2010/03/01/teen_who_made_
prank_911_call_has_hi.php. Lastly, a Kentucky man was charged with wanton
endangerment for making a false 911 calls. Lampert, supra note 89.
197
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39.2(b) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §
2819 (West 2010).
198
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-21.1-16 (West 2010).
199
Monique Garcia, Prank 911 Calls to Carry Stiffer Penalty, CHI. TRIB.,
July 26, 2010, http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2010/07/prank911-calls-to-carry-stiffer-penalty.html.
200
SHARON K. BLACK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE
290 (Rick Adams ed., 2002). Indeed, many states have also passed laws
criminalizing harassment via intrastate phone calls. Id.
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should be used to prosecute harassment when applicable. Title 47,
§ 223 of the U.S. Code prohibits “[o]bscene or harassing telephone
calls” and violations thereunder are subject to a fine, imprisonment
of up to two years, or both.201 Section 223(a)(1)(C) prohibits the
use of “a telecommunications device, whether or not conversation
or communication ensues, without [the disclosure of the caller’s]
identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any
person at the called number or who receives the
communications.”202 In United States v. Bowker, the defendant was
found guilty of telephone harassment under § 223(a)(1)(C) after he
placed multiple unwanted calls using *67 to block his caller ID
information.203 The defendant argued, unsuccessfully, that even
though the caller ID information was blocked, the victim could
recognize his voice, which meant that his identity was not actually
concealed.204 The court held that the defendant had failed to
disclose his real identity when he identified himself by another
name during phone calls and voice messages.205 Thus, anytime a
spoofer uses the technology to harass, annoy, abuse, or threaten,
and the spoofer does not state his name during the call, he should
be prosecuted under this section.
Congress has also outlawed stalking via telephone calls.206
Title 18, § 2261A(2) of the U.S. Code provides that whoever uses
“any facility of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a
course of conduct that causes substantial emotional distress to [his
victim]” with intent to harass is punishable by up to five years
201

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1) (West 2010).
§ 223(a)(1)(C). In United States v. Popa, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia defined these terms: “To annoy means to irritate, to
bother, to make someone angry by repeated action; to abuse means to use
insulting, coarse or bad language about or to someone; . . . and, fourth, to harass
means to trouble, to worry or torment.” United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 674
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
203
See generally United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2004).
204
Id. at 390.
205
Id. (holding that a receiver’s ability to “suspect, or have a very good
idea of, the caller’s identity” is irrelevant to the question of whether the
defendant disclosed his identity).
206
See Safe Homes for Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2261A(2)
(West 2010).
202
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imprisonment, a fine, or both.207 In Bowker, the Sixth Circuit held
that harassing and threatening telephone conversations and
voicemail messages, coupled with the victim’s testimony that these
conversations and messages made her fearful of leaving her house,
were sufficient to uphold a conviction under § 2261A.208 Thus, a
stalker who manipulates caller ID in order to gain access to his
victim and causes her emotional distress should be prosecuted
under § 2261A.
4. Political Harassment Prosecution Methods
The TICIDA should be charged in political harassment
prosecutions rather than other available federal alternatives. Title
18 U.S.C. § 241 provides that “[i]f two or more persons conspire to
injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person . . . in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by
the Constitution or law of the [United States] . . . [t]hey shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both . . . .”209 This section requires a specific intent to violate the
victim’s constitutional rights; however, this intent need not be the
sole intent of the conspiracy.210 Nonetheless, it might be difficult to
prove that robocalls that merely provided false information through
benign language intimidated or oppressed the called party. In these
circumstances, § 241 might not be effective in this context.
Alternatively, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) provides that “[n]o person,
whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate,
threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any
other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of such
other person to vote or to vote as he may choose . . . .”211 Since
political harassment is arguably an attempt to coerce voters, §
1971(b) seems like an easier fit in political harassment
prosecutions than § 241. However, § 1971(b) does not provide for

207
208
209
210
211

Id.
See Bowker, 372 F.3d at 370.
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 241 (West 2010).
United States v. Ellis, 595 F.2d 154, 161–62 (3d Cir. 1979).
Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(b) (West 2010).
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criminal penalties.212 Given the deficiencies of the available
alternative methods of federal prosecution, the TICIDA should be
utilized to prosecute political harassers who utilize caller ID
spoofing.
B. The FCC Should Inform Congress that Text Message
Spoofing Will Become a Successor Technology in its
Section (e)(4) Report213
The TICIDA is underinclusive because it is unclear whether it
also prohibits nefarious text message spoofing. Effective
legislation must define “call” to include both voice and text calls.
Text messages are “the most successful communications medium
since e-mail,”214 and almost 90 percent of Americans use a cell
phone.215 Text message spoofing can accomplish many of the same
illegitimate ends as traditional caller ID spoofing, as well as other
harms specific to the text message medium.216 If the TICIDA does
not expressly cover text message spoofing, then illegitimate users
might simply spoof caller ID through different means.
Accordingly, the FCC should notify Congress in its section (e)(4)
212

§ 1971(c). However, the Attorney General may seek a preventative
injunction against any party for which there are reasonable grounds to anticipate
a violation. Id.
213
Section (e)(4) of the TICIDA provides that the FCC “shall report to
Congress whether additional legislation is necessary to prohibit the provision of
inaccurate caller identification information in technologies that are successor or
replacement technologies to telecommunications service or IP-enabled voice
service.” Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(4) (West 2010).
214
Pieter Streicher, SMS Is Not to blame, ITWEB ONLINE, July 29, 2009,
http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2486
6:sms-is-not-to-blame&catid=143&Itemid=99 (“[Text] messages can be sent to
more than three billion people worldwide, and in 2008, a total of six trillion
[text] messages were sent globally.”).
215
Press Release, Spoofem.com, Spoofem.com Uses Mobile Media for
New Marketing Method (Aug. 4, 2010) (on file with author). In addition,
“52,083 text messages are sent every second,” with 83% being read within one
hour of receipt. Id. Revenue from text messaging is estimated to reach $110
billion annually by 2013. Streicher, supra note 214.
216
SMS Spoofing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SMS_spoofing
(last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
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report that text message spoofing will become a successor
technology if it is not included under the TICIDA’s prohibitions.
As with traditional caller ID spoofing, illegitimate users exploit
text message caller ID spoofing to harass or defraud others.217 For
example, a Kansas court awarded $7.3 million in a harassment suit
where the defendant sent the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s family
“profane and defamatory text messages” using a spoofing service
to mask her identity.218 When spoofers phish through text
messages, it is known as “smishing.”219 In one common fraud, a
spoofed text message informs victims that her bank account has
been suspended.220 The message states that the victim must call an
800 number in order to unlock her account.221 Upon dialing this
number, a message instructs the victim to enter her debit or credit
card account number, pin, and expiration date.222 There have also
been reports of spoofed text messages that fool receivers into
downloading costly programs.223 In one scheme, a cell phone user
receives a text message that reads, “Please call the hospital, it’s
your mother.”224 However, when the cell phone user calls the
number in the text message, a call is placed to a premium rate
service,225 and the user inadvertently downloads a virus that sends
217

Bill Meyer, Spoofing Scams Make Caller ID Untrustworthy, Can Be
Used to Defraud, Terrify Victims, CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 17, 2009, 1:29 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2009/09/spoofing_scams_make_call
er_id.html.
218
Id.
219
Smishing is a New Cyber Fraud That Uses SMS Messages, NORTHERN
STAR (Australia), Nov. 17, 2009, at 15.
220
Brian Krebs, Security Fix: The Anatomy of a Vishing Scam, WASH.
POST (Mar. 15, 2008, 5:54 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/security
fix/2008/03/the_anatomy_of_a_vishing_scam_1.html; see also Smishing is a
New Cyber Fraud That Uses SMS Messages, supra note 219.
221
Krebs, supra note 220.
222
Id.
223
See generally Ed Finegold, Internet-like Services Bring Internet-like
Crime, BILLING WORLD AND OSS TODAY, May 1, 2007, http://www.
billingworld.com/articles/2007/05/internet-like-services-bring-internet-likecrime.aspx.
224
Id.
225
Id. Premium text messages enable cell users to purchase goods billed to
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premium text messages without the user’s knowledge.226
The TICIDA defines “caller identification service” as
“information provided by a caller identification service regarding
the telephone number of, or other information regarding the
origination of, a call made using a telecommunications service or
IP-enabled voice service.”227 Unfortunately, the TICIDA does not
define the term “call.”228 Of course, it is possible that the FCC or
the courts will interpret the TICIDA to include text calls.229 Indeed,
the FCC has interpreted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(“TCPA”) to include text messages even though the statute did not
expressly cover text messages.230 The TCPA prohibits any call
placed to “any telephone number assigned to a paging service,
cellular telephone service, . . . or any service for which the called
party is charged” using an automatic dialing system or an artificial
or prerecorded voice.231 The FCC determined that the term “call”
under the TCPA includes voice calls and text calls, reasoning that
the distinguishing factor was not the type of call placed, but
whether the call was placed to a telephone number assigned to a
pay service.232 Thus, if the FCC were to apply similar logic to the
TICIDA, perhaps the FCC would find that the determinative factor
is whether the caller ID information was spoofed, not whether the
communication was made via voice or text call.
However, federal courts are not necessarily bound to
incorporate the same interpretation as the FCC.233 In determining
whether to adopt an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
statute, a court utilizes a two-step process outlined by the Supreme
Court in Chevron, Inc v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
the cell phone bill. Id.
226
Id.
227
Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(8) (West 2010).
228
See id.
229
See generally Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14115 (2003).
230
See id.
231
Id.
232
See id.
233
Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).

HATFIELD - FINAL.DOC

860

5/9/2011 4:15 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Inc.234 First, the court asks, “whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue.”235 Second, the court asks if the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.236 If these two questions are
answered in the affirmative, “a court must defer to the federal
agency’s interpretation of the statute . . . .”237 In Satterfield v.
Simon & Schuster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit adopted the FCC’s
interpretation of the term “call” under the TCPA.238 In so holding,
the court weighed heavily on Congress’ delegation of authority to
the FCC to implement the TCPA and the fact that “call” was
undefined in the TCPA.239 Noting that the TCPA was enacted
before the availability of text message technology, the court held
that Congress could not have clearly spoken about the TCPA’s
applicability to text calls.240 Of course, text messages were
available before the TICIDA’s enactment, making Congress’
omission appear more deliberate. Accordingly, even if the FCC
were to interpret “call” to include text calls, thereby utilizing its
authority to implement the statute, the issue would not simply be
settled; courts would nonetheless apply the Chevron analysis
before deciding whether to adopt the FCC’s interpretation of the
statute. This would render the legal status of text message spoofing
under the TICIDA unclear once again.
Since text message spoofing can be used to accomplish that
which the TICIDA clearly prohibits, the TICIDA must cover text
message spoofing to prevent illegitimate spoofers from utilizing
this successor technology. Therefore, the FCC should notify
Congress in its section (e)(4) report that Congress must define the
term “call” to include text message calls expressly.

234
235
236
237
238
239
240

Id.
Id.
Id.
Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 954.
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C. The FCC Should Pass Regulations to Facilitate Law
Enforcement Tracing and to Create a Do-Not-Spoof List
During debates on the TICIDA and the PHONE Act, Congress
members voiced concerns about law enforcement tracing and the
unauthorized substitution of other individuals’ phone numbers
during spoofed calls.241 The TICIDA does not directly address
these concerns.242 Before the passage of the TICIDA, the FCC
stated that its jurisdiction over caller ID spoofing companies was
unclear.243 However, now that the TICIDA is law, the FCC must
“pass regulations to implement [the TICIDA].”244 On January 26,
2011, the Department of Justice requested that the FCC promulgate
rules of this nature.245 Moreover, the legislative history shows that
Congress intended the FCC to pass regulations “imposing
obligations on entities that provide caller ID spoofing services to
the public.”246 This section argues that the FCC should promulgate
regulations to address these concerns and any others necessary to
maintain the viability of the industry.
1. Tracing
During congressional debates on the TICIDA and the PHONE
Act, representatives expressed concern about the difficulty of
241

Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Jan. 26, 2011),
available at http://www.telecomlawmonitor.com/uploads/file/DOJ%20Truth
%20in%20Caller%20ID%20letter.pdf.
242
Id.
243
Monteith Statement, supra note 51, at 3–4.
244
Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(e)(3)(A) (West
2010).
245
Letter from Lanny A. Breuer to Marlene H. Dortch, supra note 241, at 4
(“[T]he Commission should . . . allow law enforcement to trace such calls to the
true originating telephone number with appropriate authority.”); id. at 3 (“The
Department of Justice shares Congress’ concern about the ready availability of
services that allow users to spoof telephone numbers with which they have no
association whatsoever.”).
246
156 CONG. REC. H8378 (daily ed. Dec 15, 2010) (statement of Rep.
Boucher).
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tracing spoofed calls.247 When correct caller ID information is
reported, civilians and law enforcement agencies are able to dial
*57 to implement a tracing service that stores information about
the caller for the use of law enforcement.248 That technology does
not render correct information when the number is spoofed,
making the tracing process more time-consuming.249
Although tracing a spoofed call might be difficult, it is
possible.250 Often, tracking down the caller requires subpoenaing
either the commercial spoofing company or the VoIP provider.251
Teltech reports that it “take[s] a very proactive approach to help
law enforcement” when its service is used illegally.252 In order to
help law enforcement trace spoofed phone calls, the FCC should
promulgate record-keeping regulations applicable to commercial
spoofing companies and VoIP providers. These regulations should
specify what information must be kept by spoofing companies, the
period of time such records must be kept, and the penalties that
should be imposed for failure to keep such records.
2. Do-Not-Spoof List
Another concern voiced during the debates on the PHONE Act
was the protection of those whose numbers are used to mask the
identity of the spoofer.253 Often a spoofer will substitute the same
247

Sabin Statement, supra note 61 (discussing the difficulty police
encountered when trying to locate the source of threatening spoofed phone calls
made to a police officer and his family and expressing concern that spoofing
could “complicate criminal investigations”).
248
See Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement
(PHONE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 5304 Before Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 28 (2006)
(statement of Rep. Murphy).
249
Id.
250
See id.
251
Id.
252
Meyer, supra note 217.
253
See generally Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number
Enforcement (PHONE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 5304 Before Subcomm. On Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Kiko
Statement] (statement of Phil Kiko, Chief of Staff and General Counsel, U.S.
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number repeatedly.254 This happened to Phil Kiko, Chief of Staff
and General Counsel to the House of Representatives, who
received upwards of twenty phone calls per day from individuals
who believed that he was repeatedly calling them.255 Instead, a
spoofer had placed those calls spoofing Mr. Kiko’s name.256
Currently, those whose numbers are used to spoof have few
options but to change their phone numbers.257
Subsection two of the PHONE Act would have criminalized
the use of “caller ID information pertaining to an actual person or
other entity without that person’s or entity’s consent and with
intent to deceive any person or other entity about the identity of the
caller” in an apparent attempt to minimize unauthorized use of
numbers.258 However, it is too demanding to require that everyday
users of caller ID spoofing technology determine whether a phone
number belongs to another individual. Any such requirement
would likely have negative effects on legitimate users, such as
domestic violence victims, who might chose a random string of
numbers without realizing it is in fact another’s phone number. In
addition, the threat of criminal sanction for failure to get approval
to spoof a number will force these victims to use their relatives’ or
friends’ phone numbers, which might reveal too much about their
locations. Thus, the providers of caller ID spoofing should assume
the responsibility for determining whether the use of a phone
number is appropriate.
On January 26, 2011, the Department of Justice suggested that
the FCC “should consider the feasibility of requiring public
providers of caller ID spoofing services to make a good-faith effort
to verify that a user has the authority to use the substituted number,
such as by placing a one-time verification call to that number.”259
However, such a requirement is far too burdensome on the
House of Representatives).
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Preventing Harassment Through Outbound Number Enforcement Act
of 2009, H.R. 1110 § (2), 111th Cong. (2009).
259
Letter from Lanny A. Breuer, supra note 241, at 3.
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industry. Just one public provider of caller ID spoofing services
reported having over three million customers260 and these
customers might have substituted more than one number each.
Clearly, implementing such a system, which placed a phone call to
every proposed substitute number, would require a massive
undertaking by public providers. Moreover, the system would be
inefficient, as repetitive calls would surely occur.
Instead, the FCC should promulgate regulations mandating that
commercial spoofing companies maintain a shared Do-Not-Spoof
list. Unlike the Department of Justice’s proposed method, this list
would prevent spoofers from substituting the listed number or
calling listed numbers with spoofed caller ID information.
Additionally, all caller ID companies would share the price of
maintaining such a list, preventing the duplicate costs incurred
under the Department of Justice’s proposed method.
Spoofing companies already maintain lists that operate in a
similar manner. SpoofCard reports that it maintains a list of
numbers that spoofers cannot call.261 It created this list in an effort
to prevent swatting and SpoofCard continually works to increase
the list of police numbers that are not spoofable.262 In addition,
Spoofem.com now offers SpoofAbuse, where for five dollars one
can provide up to three numbers which the company will put on its
do not spoof list, so its customers will no longer be able to make
spoofed calls to that number.263 Spoofem.com also provides these
numbers to other commercial spoofing companies; however, it
does not guarantee that other companies will respect the
subscriber’s request.264 Thus, the technology for a Do-Not-Spoof
list exists, but could be used more efficiently.
Any Do-Not-Spoof list should include emergency and
government numbers so customers cannot engage in swatting and
so phishers cannot spoof these numbers to trick others. Individuals
260

Thomas, supra note 29 (noting that the number one spoofing company,
SpoofCard, has over three million customers).
261
Meyer, supra note 217.
262
Id.
263
SpoofAbuse, SPOOFEM.COM, http://spoofem.com/spoofabuse (last visited
Feb. 4, 2011).
264
Id.
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should be able to contact spoofing providers directly and the FCC
should determine a method for phone service providers to report
their customers’ requests to be added to the list.265 Lastly, the FCC
should determine the appropriate sanctions to impose when
companies fail to honor individuals’ requests that their numbers
not be used for spoofing.
V. CONCLUSION
Caller ID spoofing provides real societal benefits, but can also
deliver dangerous blows.266 The trust many place in their caller ID
service gives spoofers an advantage when they commit crimes, but
spoofing also provides necessary shelter to many legitimate
users.267 The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 is a step in the right
direction; however, additional federal response is necessary. The
Department of Justice should utilize its full array of options to
prosecute creatively when appropriate, so that the charge conveys
the gravity of the crime. In addition, the TICIDA must clearly
include text message caller ID spoofing because it is used to
accomplish the same illegitimate ends as traditional caller ID
spoofing. Lastly, the FCC should promulgate regulations to help
law enforcement trace illegitimate users and create a Do-NotSpoof list. With a comprehensive approach, Congress will be able
to ensure the legality of caller ID spoofing technology for
legitimate users, while also minimizing illegitimate uses. Victims
of caller ID spoofing, like Doug Bates, should feel safe in their
homes again.
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Monteith Statement, supra note 51; see also Kiko Statement, supra note
253, at 23 (lamenting that his telephone provider informed him that he could not
prevent spoofing accomplished with his phone number).
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See supra Part II.B (explaining legitimate and illegitimate uses of caller
ID spoofing).
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153 CONG. REC. H6257, H6258–59 (daily ed. June 12, 2007) (statement
of Rep. Engel).

